From American Caesar, by William Manchester: (A)s the 1930's drew to a close most American officers in the Philippines regarded conflict between the United States and Dai Nippon (literally Great Japan, as in Great Britain) as inevitable. But few of them doubted a swift US victory. Even (General Douglas) MacArthur was misled by racial chauvinism; when he saw the skill with which Japanese warplanes were flown in the first days of the war, he concluded that the pilots must be white men.

The Japanese, American's agreed, were a comical race. They wrote backwards and read backward. They built their houses from roof down and pulled, instead of pushing, their saws. Their baseball announcers gave the full count as "two and three." Department store bargain basements were on the top floor. Japanese women gave men gifts on Saint Valentine's Day. Papers were stapled in the upper right-hand corner. To open their locks you had to turn the key to the left. If they fell in the mud, they laughed; telling you of grave personal misfortunes, they grinned.

Japanese murderers apologized for messing up the house, and the Japanese host who received you in his home with exquisite courtesy might, upon meeting you on the street, shove you roughly into the gutter. They were stocky, bandy-legged, and buck-toothed. Their civilians wore crumpled hats, dark alpaca suits, and tinted glasses in public. Their soldiers suited up in uniforms resembling badly wrapped brown-paper parcels. The notion that they could shoot straight—not to mention lick red-blooded Americans—was regarded in Manila as preposterous.

 

From German Admiral Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: We had no contact with the Japanese experts or attaches in Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December the attache in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America. ....

To my knowledge there were no official conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. .... 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: "No." I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff.

  

From The Columbia History of the World, edited by John A. Garraty and Peter Gay: The Western democracies opposed each new step in Japan's expansion. Growing friction with them caused the Far Eastern crises to become part of a world confrontation between fascism and its enemies. Japan joined the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1940 more from a perception that she shared common foes with European fascists than from any fundamental community of positive goals. The pact further deepened American hostility, yet the United States still permitted the export of strategic materials to Japan until the following summer, fearing that to embargo them would only trigger Japanese seizure of new sources of supply in Southeast Asia. When Japan did occupy Indochina, in prelude to further threats southward, America responded with a general embargo. In ensuing negotiations aimed at reducing the tension the two sides made mutually incompatible demands: Japan, that the United States recognize her position in China; and the United States, that Japan withdraw from China. The Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, was a preemptive strike, based on the premise that the United States was already irrevocably committed to resist those actions of Japan in East Asia that had by then become the unalterable conditions of her national policy.

 

From And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets, by Edwin T. Layton: Kimmel stood by the window of his office at the submarine base, his jaw set in stony anguish. As he watched the disaster across the harbor unfold with terrible fury, a spent .50 caliber machine gun bullet crashed through the glass. It brushed the admiral before it clanged to the floor. It cut his white jacket and raised a welt on his chest. "It would have been merciful had it killed me," Kimmel murmured to his communications officer.

From Washington Goes to War, by David Huntley: It may be that at historic moments of stunning surprise or extraordinary stress, great leaders utter stately and sonorous phrases suitable for future preservation on granite slabs. But Roosevelt's response on hearing the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor was a good deal less than stately. His response was, "No!" ....

Roosevelt called Secretary of State Hull, who was at that moment receiving the Japanese ambassador in his office at the State, War and Navy Building next door to the White House. He told Hull the news and instructed him to treat the Japanese coolly. Japan's ambassador, Kichisaburo Nomura, arrived at Hull's office late because, it was learned later, his embassy staff had been drinking Scotch whisky all night and the translators were still drunk the next morning. They had to struggle to get Tokyo's message into English for Hull to read. When the ambassador and an aide came in, Hull did not treat them coolly. He called them "bastards" and "pissants." They left, running awkwardly down the corridors trying to escape the press and photographers.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: It was a complete surprise for me and the Naval Operations Staff that this attack (on Pearl Harbor) took place; and it is a complete mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume that they would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside Japan, who was not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise attacked Russian ships "out of the blue" without anyone suspecting anything at all.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: We never had any military discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he [Raeder] warned Hitler against war with America in view of England's naval superiority and her co-operation with America. ....

First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us. Besides, through the reports of our naval attache in Washington, Vice Admiral Witthoft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.

I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and installations, as Witthoft stated a few months before the war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United States. ....

In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure (to proposed [sic] that Japan should attack Singapore) and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder's reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England's important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against England. .... I have already stated that before Japan's entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved. .... We heard about this (Pearl Harbor) for the first time over the radio.

From Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany's First U-boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II, by Michael Gannon: It was night when the message from B-Dienst, the radio intelligence service of the German Navy, reached Adolf Hitler's underground bunker at the Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair) field headquarters near Rastenburg, deep in the Goerlitz forest of East Prussia. When he read it the Fuehrer was stunned: JAPAN BEGAN HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ON 7 DECEMBER. AT 1930 HOURS CENTRAL EUROPEAN TIME STRONG AIR FORMATIONS ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR (HONOLULU). A declaration of war might have been expected, but a carrier strike across 3,200 miles of open sea against the American main battle fleet?

If at that moment Hitler recalled the maxim of Frederick the Great, whom he claimed to emulate—"It is pardonable to be defeated but never to be surprised"—he knew that the muse of history was not likely to absolve him. The master of Europe was caught completely by surprise. The same message but with additional details of US warship and aircraft losses...was read with equal amazement by Admiral Karl Doenitz (commander in chief, U-boats). Doenitz went straight to his Situation Room and moved his dividers across the three-foot-diameter world globe that he used for rapid-distance calculation. From the principal U-boat base at Lorient he tracked the Great Circle distance to New York City on the East Coast of the United States—distance: 3,000 nautical miles. ....

It was the East Coast of the United States...that interested Doenitz most. A strike there would have much the same effect as the Japanese had had at Hawaii, revealing American vulnerability to a determined military foe. It would intimidate US defenses and humiliate the civilian population. Most important, if followed by additional and unremitting strikes during the period when US naval and air forces could still be expected to be weak and inexperienced, the operation could result in damage to the US and Allied war effort far exceeding the damage wreaked at Pearl Harbor. Lost in the anchorage at Hawaii, it appeared from the news flash, were aged, slow warships, obsolescent by the standards of the new capital ships of the German Fleet; lost on the United States' Atlantic doorstep, which contained the busiest sea-lanes in the world, would be a significant part of the merchant lifeblood that was keeping England in the war, not to mention fueling the United States' own nascent war industries...

The commander in chief knew that all his commanders would be of one mind with him: The Americans must be made to pay for their false neutrality; for their arrogance in declaring four-fifths of the Atlantic to be part of the Western Hemisphere; for their sighting reports on U-boats to British destroyers; and for their hitherto-untouchable convoys of war material and food to enemy England. .... When the Fuehrer declared war on the United States, as he soon must, Doenitz would be poised to strike a blow against the United States as sudden and as jarring as a beat on a kettledrum.

From In Search of History, by Theodore H. White: That Sunday afternoon I was writing a rehash of the tensions in Asia, shaped by my conviction that, no matter what the Japanese were saying in Washington, we would have to fight them, when the telephone rang. One of my office mates, James Aldridge, who later quit journalism to write novels, lifted the phone, let it drop, and yelled, "Jesus Christ! The Japs are bombing Pearl Harbor; it's on the radio." We rushed to the news ticker, and it was hammering out a bulletin: Flash...White House Says Japs Attack Pearl Harbor.

We went back to our office and we looked out the windows from our tower in Rockefeller Center. Down below was the jostle of a Sunday afternoon in mid Manhattan, the streets crowded with automobiles of parents showing their children the Christmas trees and holiday sights of the great city. We made paper airplanes and sent messages sailing through the air to the streets below, saying: "We are at war," or "We are at war with Japan," or "The Japanese are bombing America." We were gleeful; I most of all. In that first hour none of us knew how badly the American fleet had been damaged at Pearl Harbor. But it was the right war, a good war, and it had to be fought and won. This is the only conviction of mine that has lasted unchanged for thirty-five years: it was better for America to have fought that war and won, than to have let the world be taken by those who killed and had no shame in killing.

From Silent Missions, by Vernon A. Walters: The next thing I remembered was Lieutenant Romano shaking me by the shoulder and saying, "Walters, get up. We are at war." "With Germany?" I asked and he replied that we were at war with Japan, who had attacked Pearl Harbor that morning. I was surprised because I knew that our Navy had been convoying supplies to Britain and shooting at German submarines on sight, but I had not sensed the imminence of war in Asia. I had always believed that it was far more likely that we would become involved in Germany first.

From Ribbentrop's IMT testimony: At the time I tried to induce Japan to attack Singapore, because it was impossible to make peace with England and I did not know what military measures we could take to achieve this end. In any case, the Fuehrer directed me to do everything I could in the diplomatic field to weaken England's position and thus achieve peace. We believed that this could best be done through an attack by Japan on England's strong position in East Asia. For that reason I tried to induce Japan, at that time, to attack Singapore. After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I also tried to make Japan attack Russia, for I thought that in this way the war could be ended most speedily.

Japan, however, did not do that. She did the—she did neither of the things we wanted her to do, but instead, she did a third. She attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. This attack came as a complete surprise to us. We had considered the possibility of Japan's attacking Singapore, that is England, or perhaps Hong Kong, but we never considered an attack on the United States as being to our advantage. We knew that in the case of an attack on England, there was a possibility that the United States might intervene; that was a question which, naturally, we had often considered. We hoped very much, however, that this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The first news I received of the attack on Pearl Harbor was through the Berlin press, and then from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. I should like to say under oath that all other reports, versions, or documentary evidence are entirely false. I would like to go even further to state that the attack came as a surprise even to the Japanese Ambassador—at least he told me that.

From Churchill: A Biography, by R. Jenkins: Churchill saw no way of winning the war without full American participation. His 'give us the tools and we will finish the job' broadcast of 9 February 1941 was a piece of tactical phrasing and not of hard truth. The most that he really meant was 'give us the tools and we will hold on long enough for you to take your time about coming in.' It was therefore a moment of unalloyed joy when he heard the news of Pearl Harbor. He was at Checquers, dining with Winant and Harriman. This was typical of the priority which he was giving Anglo-American relations and the timing was convenient as things turned out.

Ironically they had to restrain him from immediately on hearing the first sound bulletin telephoning the Foreign Office and telling them to declare war on Japan. It was pointed out to him that he could hardly do this on the basis of an unconfirmed news item. It contrasted with Roosevelt's greater caution (although he did not have Churchill's unfettered executive powers in matters of peace or war) which meant that America was not at war with Germany—or Italy—until four days later, when it was Berlin and Rome —not Washington—which took the initiative to involve the United States in the European war...After December 1941, whatever the vicissitudes, he did not doubt the ultimate outcome. Of course he regretted the severe American naval losses. But they were as nothing compared with the gain of having the full potential might of the United States irreversibly committed to the cause for which he had been fighting.

From J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets, by Curt Gentry: In addition to his many other duties, on December 8 President Roosevelt asked J. Edgar Hoover "to take charge of all censorship arrangements." Though it was a temporary appointment, to be effective only until a director of censorship could be picked and a new agency established, Hoover took his duties seriously. In charge just a few hours, he succeeded in killing a New York Times headline which characterized the Pearl Harbor attack the worst naval defeat in US history (though it obviously was), and he "persuaded" Drew Pearson and Robert Allen to edit a "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column which gave exact details of the losses in Hawaii.

Hoover, according to a memo he sent to the presidential press secretary Steve Early, informed Pearson that if he and Allen "continued to print such inaccurate and such unpatriotic statements the Government would be compelled to appeal to their subscribers direct and bar them from all privileges that go with the relationship between the press and our government." Pearson had a different recollection of their conversation. He wrote in his diary, "I got a call from J. Edgar Hoover...in effect threatening to put me in jail unless we killed the story giving the real truth on Pearl Harbor. I told Edgar that he was nuts, that there was no law by which he could put me in jail, and that he was not the man to interpret the law. He admitted all this, said the Steve Early at the White House had called up and asked him to throw the fear of God in me."

From Winston Churchill and his Inner Circle, by John Colville: Churchill believed that (First Sea Lord) Pound had the best brains in the navy. Others attributed that distinction to the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Tom Phillips. ... Like all chairbound sailors, Phillips longed to turn his back on the Admiralty and put to sea. At the end of 1941 he had his wish and as he steamed without air cover off Malaysia, in a gallant but fruitless endeavor to intercept reported Japanese landings on the coast, his flagship, Prince of Wales, and her companion, the huge battle cruiser Repulse, were sunk by enemy torpedo bombers. Two-thirds of the men were saved, but Phillips went down with his ship.

General Ismay, who thought him an officer of exceptional ability, told me that when news of the calamity reached him, his memory went back to a meeting of the Joint Planning Staff a few years before the war. The naval representative, Captain Tom Phillips, R.N., held forth on the invulnerability of modern capital ships to air attack. It was an Admiralty theme that infuriated the Air Ministry. It was even more frequently propounded, and was only a few degrees less ridiculous, than that voiced in some War Office quarters that tanks had frequent mechanical failures whereas cavalry horses did not. On this occasion the Air Ministry representative was Air Commodore Bert Harris. According to Ismay, he thumped the table and said this: "Phillips, you make me sick. I can tell you what is going to happen. One day we shall be at war with Japan and you will be sailing across the South China seas in one of your beautiful battleships. Out of a cloud there will come a squadron of Japanese bombers and your great ship capsizes, you will turn to your navigating officer and say, 'That was a whopping great mine we hit.'"

Even by December 1941, Phillips, for all his shrewdness and ability, had failed to learn the lesson about air cover taught by many painful episodes in the preceding fifteen months. Others had been equally slow to learn, but Phillips's tragic death finally cemented in the minds of soldiers, sailors and politicians an irrefutable truth which they had known but disregarded.

From The Devil's Disciples, by Anthony Read: The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a shock to Hitler, and to Ribbentrop, who had spent much of the previous year vainly trying to persuade the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union...Ribbentrop had become convinced that war with the United States was inevitable, and had begun urging the Japanese to move against the Americans instead...after telling Ambassador Oshima that 'he did not believe that Japan could avoid a showdown with the United States, and that the situation could hardly ever turn more favorable to Japan than it did now,' he assured him that Germany would join in immediately should Japan go to war with America. He had no idea that the Japanese fleet had already sailed from the isolated Tankan Bay in the Kurile Islands heading for Hawaii—the Germans were being kept in the dark, just as they had always kept their allies in the dark over their own invasions. ....

Drawing on an understanding of "the American soul" which he claimed to have gained during the four years he had lived there, Ribbentrop was scathing about the United States' military potential. Repeating the grave miscalculations he had made of Britain's will to fight, he now wrote off the Americans—their weapons, he claimed, were 'junk,' and they would never be able to fight in Europe—and encouraged Hitler to declare war on them at once, to pre-empt America getting in first. "A great power doesn't let itself have war declared on it, it declares war itself," he told Ernst Weizacker.

At noon on 11 December, he had the pleasure of doing so. He summoned the American Charge d'Affairs, Leland Morris, and, keeping him standing, read out a formal statement accusing President Roosevelt of inciting war through repeated violations of neutrality, belligerent attacks on German U-boats, and overt acts of war. Then, with a "sweeping gesture" he handed over the document and dismissed Morris, "who obviously felt his position keenly," with a swift bow. Immediately after Morris had left, Ribbentrop welcomed the Japanese and Italian Ambassador's, to sign an extension of the Tripartite Pact stating that none of them would make a unilateral peace with Britain or the USA. For Ribbentrop, this was the apogee of his career to date, now that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was buried and forgotten: his brainchild had become a full-scale military alliance. It was also his last significant diplomatic success.

From Hitler, A Study In Tyranny, by Alan Bullock: After the invasion of the Soviet Union Ribbentrop made persistent attempts through the German Ambassador in Tokyo to persuade the Japanese to take the Germans in the rear. The one course, however, which Hitler had never recommended to the Japanese had been to attack the USA: indeed, he had constantly repeated to Matsuoka in the spring that one of the beneficial results of seizing Singapore would be to deter the Americans from entering the war. It might be expected therefore that the Fuehrer would show some irritation at the independent course adopted by the Tokyo Government in face of his advice.

On the contrary, he agreed to give the formal guarantee for which the Japanese asked and appears to have been delighted with the news of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese tactics appealed to him and he tells Oshima: 'You gave the right declaration of war. This method is the only proper one...one should strike—as hard as possible—and not waste time declaring war.' He rapidly decided to follow the Japanese example by declaring war on the United States himself. When Ribbentrop pointed out that the Tripartite Pact only bound Germany to assist Japan in the event of an attack on her by some other Power, and that to declare war on the USA would be to add to the number of Germany's opponents, Hitler dismissed these as unimportant considerations. He seems never to have weighed the possible advantages of deferring an open breach with America as long as possible and allowing the USA to become involved in a war in the Pacific which would reduce the support she was able to give Great Britain.

Hitherto, Hitler had shown considerable patience in face of the growing aid given by the US Government to the British. But he was coming to the conclusion that a virtual state of war already existed with the USA and that there was no point in delaying the clash which he regarded as inevitable. The violence of Hitler's attack on President Roosevelt in his speech of 11 December suggests the force of the resentment accumulating under the restraint he had so far practiced in his relations with America. Two other factors affected Hitler's decision. The first was his disastrous underestimate of American strength... ...The second factor is more difficult to assess. When Mussolini learned of the possibility of war between Japan and the United States, in expressing his satisfaction he made the remark: "Thus we arrive at war between the continents which I have foreseen since September 1939." The prospect of such a war embracing the whole world excited Hitler's imagination with its taste for the grandiose and stimulated that sense of historic destiny which was the drug on which he fed.

From The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler, by Robert Payne: Early in December, following a successful counterattack at Rostov, the Red Army snatched the initiative all along the (Eastern) front, and for the first time a shudder of fear swept through the Wolf's Lair. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of America did not remove this fear. The Army high command was incredulous when Hitler took the train for Berlin to announce on December 11 that Germany was at war with the United States. It pleased Hitler to hurl abuse at President Roosevelt, who had not fought as a common soldier in World War 1 (as had Hitler) but had enjoyed all the luxuries of the upper class. He announced that the entry of America into the war would make very little difference to the final outcome. He spoke as though the entry of America into the war was a matter of no importance at all.

From Franklin and Winston, by Jon Meacham: Why did Hitler do it? Partly because he misjudged Roosevelt and America. "I don't see much future for the Americans," Hitler said in January 1942. "It's a decayed country. And they have their racial problem, and the problem of social inequities. .... My feelings against Americanism are feelings of hatred and deep repugnance...Everything about the behavior of American society reveal that it is half Judaized, and the other half Negrified. How can one expect a state like that to hold together—a country where everything is built on the dollar."

He had not counted on Churchill's stalwart defense of Britain in 1940; now, as 1941 drew to a close, he did not count on Roosevelt's strength and determination. It was one of Hitler's many mistakes, and one from which he could never recover. "The Great Republic" was at war at last. Through the ensuing decades of what Henry Luce, founder of the Time-Life magazine empire, would call "the American Century," a national myth took shape about World War II; that she fought to defeat Hitler and to preserve democracy. And America did—ultimately.. Yet the United States hit back only when it was, as Roosevelt said on December 8, "suddenly and deliberately attacked by...the Empire of Japan" and entered the war against Germany only when it was clear that Hitler would join Tokyo's fight.

From Ribbentrop's IMT testimony: When the news of Pearl Harbor came, the Fuehrer had to make a decision. The text of the Tripartite Pact bound us to assist Japan only in case of an attack against Japan herself. I went to see the Fuehrer, explained the legal aspect of the situation and told him that, although we welcomed a new ally against England, it meant we had a new opponent to deal with as well, or would have one to deal with if we declared war on the United States. The Fuehrer then decided that the United States had already fired upon our ships and thereby had practically created a state of war; that it was therefore only a question of form, or, at least, that this official state of war might supervene at any moment, as a result of an incident; and that in the long run it was impossible that this state of affairs in the Atlantic continue without a German-American war.

He then instructed me to draft a note—which he subsequently altered—and to hand the American Ambassador his papers...We naturally had close co-operation with Italy. By that I mean that in the further course of war, we were forced to all intents and purposes to take charge of all military operations there ourselves, or, at least, to take joint charge of them. Co-operation with Japan was very difficult, for the simple reason that we could communicate with the Japanese Government only by air. We had contact with them from time to time through U-boats, but there was no co-ordinated military or political plan of campaign. I believe that on this point General Marshall's view is correct, namely, that there was no close strategic co-operation or planning of any kind; and, really, there was not any.

From Adolf Hitler, by John Toland: One reason Hitler had delayed implementing the Final Solution was hope that his implied threat to exterminate the Jews would keep Roosevelt out of the war. But Pearl Harbor ended this faint expectation and Hitler's hope turned to bitterness, with extermination becoming a form of international reprisal. The decision taken, the Fuehrer made it known to those entrusted with the Final Solution that the killings should be done as humanely as possible. This was in line with his conviction that he was observing God's injunction to cleanse the world of vermin.

Still a member in good standing of the Church of Rome despite detestation of its hierarchy ("I am now as before a Catholic and will always remain so."), he carried within him its teaching that the Jew was the killer of God. The extermination, therefore, could be done without a hint of conscience since he was merely acting as the avenging hand of God—so long as it was done impersonally, without cruelty. Himmler was pleased to murder with mercy. He ordered technical experts to devise gas chambers which could eliminate masses of Jews efficiently and "humanely," then crowded the victims into boxcars and sent them east to stay on ghettos until the killing centers in Poland were completed.

From The Crucial Years: 1939-1941, by Hanson W. Baldwin: From the flames and the many circumstantial bits and pieces of those days, revisionist historians have created a "great conspiracy" theory of Pearl Harbor, a complete fabric of deception. President Roosevelt, it is alleged, deliberately planned Pearl Harbor as a means of ensuring US entry into World War 2. Roosevelt and his military commanders in Washington (Marshall and Stark) knew beforehand of the impending Japanese attack, the theory goes, and deliberately withheld the information from Kimmel and Short.

The terse answer to such allegations is baloney. Roosevelt, it is true, was a political manipulator; he had flouted, circumvented, or with congressional approval revised the neutrality legislation of 1935-37 (which had, at the time, the overwhelming support of the American people). He often said one thing and did another; he did not hesitate to deceive the public. He believed strongly that the United States must for its own salvation enter World War 2; he had ordered actions in the Atlantic, most of them ultimately approved by Congress but many after the event, which had already resulted in an undeclared limited war against Germany; and he had stressed that he wanted Japan to fire the first shot, strike the first blow. (Ironically, it was the United States that fired the first shot against a midget submarine outside Pearl Harbor early on December 7.)

At almost the eleventh hour in the Pacific (on December 1) Roosevelt had ordered Admiral Hart in Manila through Stark to charter three small vessels for "a defensive information patrol" off the Indochina coast. They were to have an identity as "US men-of-war" and were to be commanded by a naval officer. These "small vessels" may well have been intended as "tethered goats" to lure the tiger of Japanese aggression, on the theory—then widely believed in Washington—that Tokyo would bypass the Philippines and attack British and Dutch possessions only. The sinking by the Japanese of any of the three little ships would serve, the theory held, as another Panay Incident, an excuse for US hostilities.

In the event, the "three small vessels" were never employed in their intended role; the Japanese struck too soon, and the Philippine Islands were one of their objectives. In short, Roosevelt undoubtedly believed, like millions of Americans, that the United States' vital interests required the nations' entry into the war, and in order to convince a large and reluctant portion of public opinion, he wanted the Japanese to strike first. But all this proves no monstrous plot or heinous culpability.

From The Undeclared War, by William L Langer and S. Everett Gleason: Ever since the outbreak of the war in Europe, and indeed before it, most Americans had contemplated with resignation the day when the United States would join in hostilities against the Axis powers. In response to the logic of events, at least as much as to the leadership of the President, an ever increasing number had come to feel that it was not merely their country's hapless fate but its bounden duty to enter the great conflict. The dimensions of America's stake in the outcome had been measured by its Government and its citizens over a period of more than two years. The significance of each momentous step taken along the road which from the start so many believed destiny would compel the nation to follow had been debated in congress, over the air, in the press, and from the platform.

Whatever, therefore, the final judgement on the wisdom of America's involvement in the global war, the indictment or the vindication must encompass the whole American people. It was not only the swift disaster at Pearl Harbor which explain the sobriety and even the grimness with which the United States now set its wartime course. The steadfastness and valor of all those warring peoples who were presently to become the United Nations had afforded the American democracy a unique opportunity, by democratic process, to appraise and at long last to respond to the appeal for leadership in the struggle. Without the elation of 1917, but surely with profounder understanding of the values it sought to preserve, the New World again advanced to rescue the old.